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Ports are a crucial element in any Free Trade Agreement because of their role in 
moving goods.  Unfortunately, the port situation in Central America was not 
considered during Free Trade Agreement negotiations with the United States 
(CAFTA).  Although CAFTA is intended to provide benefits for exporters and 
importers, these benefits will not be fully realized due to the region’s high port 
costs. These high costs, along with concerns regarding infrastructure, security, 
efficiency, and productivity, can diminish CAFTA’s potential benefits. Central 
America must therefore enact legal reforms to privatize port operations, as the 
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1. Introduction 
 
The Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR)
1 
was signed on August 5, 2004 to eliminate tariffs and trade barriers, expanding regional 
opportunities for the workers, manufacturers, consumers, farmers, ranchers, and service 
providers of all these countries.
2  CAFTA-DR will immediately eliminate tariffs on more than 80 
percent of U.S. exports goods of consumer and industrial products, phasing out the remaining 
tariffs over 10 years.  Through this agreement several countries have implicitly agreed to 
eliminate decades of poor performance and inefficient operation by some state enterprises, 
following governments all over the world in embracing privatization.  Since the 1980s, 
thousands of state-owned enterprises have been turned over to the private sector in Africa, Asia, 
Latin America and Western Europe, a trend spurred by the well-documented poor performance 
and failure of state-owned enterprises and sustained by the efficiency improvements of privatized 
firms around the world.  
    By the 1990s, the remnants of state-owned enterprises were still an issue in Latin 
America.  The state operated ports, but they performed inefficiently.  Since then Latin America 
has been privatizing ports to improve services, and this decision has attracted foreign investors in 
the region.  Some countries have decided to  privatize their ports completely, or at least to 
introduce the participation of the private sector because ports were no longer profitable.   
However, privatization is still an issue in Central American countries such as El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica; either they have no private ports or 
privatization has not developed.
3  In the meantime, Central American ports provide excellent 
examples of how ports should not be run.
4   
This study will analyze the provisions established by CAFTA-DR to implement port 
privatization and bring ports in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua to 
the same level as those of Chile, Mexico, and Panama.  Section 2 of this paper identifies the 
roots of current port problems and explains how CAFTA-DR can be a good vehicle to introduce 
private sector participation to invest in ports and turn monopolies into a competitive business.  
The section additionally surveys changes in Latin America after privatization and the different 
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levels of privatization in the region.  Section 3 summarizes the legal conditions that prevent 
Central America from privatizing ports, as well as the region’s weaknesses in infrastructure 
policy.  Section 4 describes how deficient port administration can influence maritime 
transportation cost and discusses the importance of port productivity.  Finally, Section 5 
concludes that Central American ports need to be modernized.  Since countries themselves are 
not able to finance port modernization, privatization is the only instrument available for 
achieving this goal through attracting private sector investments.  
    
2. Historical Background 
 
In Central America, the fear of private monopolies is stronger than in many other regions.
5  This 
is due to the fact that, historically, some of the countries suffered from the centralization of 
economic power among a few dominant families or foreign multinationals.
6  A complete 
privatization, as in the case of the British ports, is therefore politically unlikely, and “landlord” 
arrangements in which authorities lease to operators are more likely to prevail.  The region’s 
ports are overstaffed and inefficient, and their principal function seems to be that of a non-tariff 
barrier to protect domestic industries from international competition, as a public monopoly 
provides the main services.  In some countries such Mexico, Colombia, Panama, governments 
own the land, infrastructure and superstructure and provide the “stevedores” (to load or unload 
the cargo of a ship or to engage in the process of loading or unloading such a vessel) and all 
other services, which are called “port services.” Such ports are common in Central America, but 
the way the region’s ports are managed is likely to prevent the CAFTA-DR from delivering all of 
the benefits hoped for by its signatories.   
In general, facilities at Central America’s state-managed ports have not been updated for 
many years. In some cases port infrastructure is deteriorating, and in almost all cases 
modernizing technology has remained a low priority. The transition to private participation in 
port management will depend on governments’ willingness to promote foreign trade and their 
need to reduce the fiscal burden.  The CAFTA-DR may lead to enhanced private sector 
participation in port services.   
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  Private sector involvement, however, is not guaranteed. Whether or not private 
companies play an active role in port management appears to depend on the nature of the country 
and its perceived economic and political risk.  Common corruption, illiteracy, and pending 
broader structural reform seem to have a negative impact on both demand for and supply of 
private investment, and these factors have created obstacles to port reforms in Central American 
countries.  Consequently, these countries should consider the CAFTA-DR an opportunity and a 
motivation to proceed with the necessary reforms in the future.  Port privatization operations 
may help governments achieve other broad structural economic reforms as well, because funds 
previously used for ports will be available for improving education and fostering political 
stability, which will reduce the region’s remaining obstacles to privatization.       
  Major Latin American ports are no longer efficient state-run public monopolies.  The 
approach taken towards private and public sector ownership and operation of ports varies from 
country to country,  although in Central American countries ports are still largely run by public 
monopolies. In general, the “Latin American Model” of port management has five basic 
characteristics: landlord type common user ports, specialized ports and terminals, private ports 
and terminals, foreign participation, and small and divided common user ports. Although not all 
countries have adopted the model, some countries are in the process of increasing private sector 
participation in their ports. None of the five characteristics on its own is unique to Latin 
America, but their combination sets Latin America apart from other regions. 
  It is necessary to stress five specific points in order to explain port operations in Central 
America.  First, the “landlord model” is most common in Latin America.  Governments give 
concessions to individual companies for 30 years.
7  The private operators invest in infrastructure, 
and own and operate the superstructure.  Usually, this landlord scheme is called a “mono-
operating” system because the same operator provides the stevedore services.  The exception is 
Chile, where “mono-operating” is not allowed because it inhibits competition.  Second, private 
specialized ports and industrial terminals, managed by private entities, handle two-thirds of the 
region’s import and export volume.
8 Third, ports can be 100 percent privately owned and 
operated, and port operators have established new private ports and terminals, including both 
general cargo and container facilities.  Fourth, foreign companies have a strong presence in Latin 
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American ports, with international port operators including Hutchison, ICTSI, and P&O.  Fifth, 
many common port users in Latin America cannot be considered hub ports such as Los Angeles 
and Long Beach in the US.
 9  Panama and Cartagena are the exception to this rule, because those 
ports have several competing terminals.  These five characteristics of port privatization are most 
commonly found in South American ports, which are generally well-run and in compliance with 
the standards of the national and international service sector, but are often lacking in their 
Central American counterparts.   
  The service sector deserves particular attention, as it is becoming the most important 
sector in the global economy, representing around 70 percent of global value added and 18 
percent of total global exports.
10  Since laws and service regulations that may discriminate 
against foreign supplies impact trade in services,
11  the results of negotiations to liberalize 
services were compiled in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the 
framework of the World Trade Organization.  In addition, South America, Central America, and 
the Caribbean Community have been integrating trade operations to exchange goods. All of these 
agreements have contributed to port liberalization in Latin America and led to greater 
participation of the private sector. 
    Latin American countries have different levels of port privatization based on the 
characteristics described above. Four levels of port privatization may be identified.   In the first 
and most common type, port property is owned by the state but the activity is given in 
concession to private entities.  In this arrangement, prevalent in Panama, Argentina, Colombia, 
and Mexico, governments grant individual terminal concessions to private operators for a period 
of 12 to 30 years,  and those operators invest in infrastructure, as well as owning and operating 
the superstructure.  The landlord model is called a “mono-operator” system because the same 
operator that has the concession is also usually the only company that provides stevedore 
services on a given terminal.  The second group is “common users” in which ports’ stevedore 
companies have been privatized and labor unions have been reformed. This group is in the 
process of completing private sector participation, which means that the state has transferred 
                                                 
9 The external trade of a country is closely linked with its geographical location, with the transport services that 
cover the distance to markets, and the ports through which that trade passes.  Recent advances in maritime transport, 
growing international economic integration, and the privatization of ports can give rise to expectations that ports 
could be developed that concentrate both domestic cargo and that of neighboring countries for its subsequent 
redistribution. 
10  Mattos and Acosta (2003).   
11  Mattos and Acosta (2003).     8
ports to private entities.  The practices of Chile, Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela may be classified 
within this group.   In a third group, made up of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
Guatemala,
12  initial stages of port reform have occurred in at least some facilities.
13  Finally, in a 
fourth and overlapping group that includes the Central American countries, some governments 
directly run port services and operate ports the same way that they did two decades ago.
14 Ports 
in Latin American countries outside of Central America have made significant reforms in the last 
two decades in areas including legal arrangements, private sector concessions, infrastructure 
development, efficiency improvements, increased competition, and privatization,
15 and citizens 
and foreign investors alike can see the resulting improvements.
16  Central America, however, has 
a long way to go to improve its ports, and there have been few substantial changes.  
  Since port privatization has occurred in Latin America, countries like Chile and Mexico 
have improved their ports in many areas.
17 Structural design was the main issue in both countries, 
where port structures were poor and inefficient.  After reform, the private sector was allowed to 
play an active role in port management.  As a result, private sector participation made city ports 
increasingly important to the countries’ economies.
18  The connection between the countryside 
and city ports was enhanced as cities became the center of activity in global commerce because 
ports are the connectors between production and distribution in global economies.
19  
  Port privatization has been accompanied by advanced technologies which have improved 
efficiency and competitiveness.
20  Of particular note in this regard are computerized process 
control systems, which optimize container movement and storage and provide for electronic 
conveyance of documents and data. 
  Efficient ports in developing countries such as Colombia, Chile, Panama, Argentina, and 
Brazil tend to operate in a private environment,
21 and reforms have turned ports that were 
previously notorious for their inefficiency into facilities characterized by efficiency, security, 
high productivity and low cost.  Competition among ports has represented a central feature of 
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successful port operations,
22  and private investment and initiatives favoring competitiveness are 
expected to bring about major improvements in Central American countries’ port industries.    
     
3. Port Privatization from the Perspective of CAFTA-DR 
 
Proposals for private-sector participation in public-sector ports usually stem from one or more of 
the following factors: i) competition from other ports, or among customers; ii) government   
political platforms; iii) public outcry against high port charges; iv) low productivity; and v) theft 
and unavailability of merchandise.  Given Central America’s experience with public sector port 
monopolies, which have given rise to many of the concerns noted above, any entity providing 
port facilities and services there should operate in a commercial environment governed by 
market mechanisms.  Governments should consequently adopt a legal regime combining 
deregulation and decentralization with antimonopoly laws and specific legislation defining 
private sector participation. 
 
3.1 The CAFTA-DR Perspective  
 
Although port privatization was not addressed during the CAFTA-DR negotiations, the current 
port situation in Central America could affect CAFTA-DR’s performance, as successful 
implementation of  CAFTA-DR requires high productivity, efficiency, security, and low cost in 
port facilities. Conversely, the absence of these features is likely to cause dissatisfaction among 
domestic and foreign investors, both actual and potential.  Ideally, Central American countries 
should have emphasized reform of port polices and infrastructures, lowering transportation costs, 
and improving efficiency, among other issues,  in order to satisfy CAFTA-DR’s demands.            
Governments in Central America have to recognize that improving the competitiveness 
of their products means giving ports the ability to respond to market forces with the same 
flexibility as private sector firms.  Such flexibility includes freedom to make budgets, invest, 
avoid tariffs, and hire and fire without going through extensive bureaucratic procedures.
23  
Nonetheless, some Central American ports are still operating under monopolistic practices 
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imposed by private or public entities.
24  In the absence of competition, carriers have to accept 
inefficient conditions at these ports.
25  
 
3.2 Port Reform in Central America 
 
The infrastructure of state-run Central American ports is clearly deficient, and have deficient 
infrastructures when run by states, and private sector participation (PSP) has only been 
incorporated in some geographical areas.  Port privatization is an issue that Central American 
countries do not want to face due to the opposition to change common in large bureaucracies.  
However, now that CAFTA-DR has been signed, Central America will have to realize deeper 
reforms in this area in order to make the agreement successful.
26  While the agreement benefits 
Central American countries by giving them access to the world’s largest market, CAFTA-DR 
also requires each nation to undertake legal reforms of local regulations.
27  Customs laws, for  
instance, must be reformed in order to facilitate port traffic.
28  Since the essential point of the 
agreement is to bring progress to the region by increasing exports between the parties, the 
signatories have in effect committed themselves to facilitating the cross-border movement of 
goods and services.
29  Although Central American countries have no way of aggressively 
incorporating private sector participation into ports, many deficiencies must be addressed to 
prepare ports to be more efficient, competitive, and profitable before CAFTA-DR’s demands can 
be met.
30   
CAFTA-DR created several mechanisms to implement the agreement.  From a CAFTA-
DR perspective countries should focus more on port reform and privatization since ports are the 
main way to transport goods.  Nonetheless, the implementation of port modernization and 
privatization has not yet been completely successful in Central American countries, even though 
the process started a decade ago.
31  However, port reform has progressed in some parts of Central 
America. At the same time, infrastructure and entry points to the maritime corridor remain 
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problems,
32 and several ports lack efficient terminals and container facilities.  Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, and Nicaragua have been leaders in the region, with at least minimal private sector 
participation,
33 while El Salvador and Honduras are more conservative on this matter.  
Central American countries can learn from successful port reforms in Mexico, Panama, 
Colombia, and Chile. Mexico’s experience is interesting in part because of its extensive maritime 
territory and the corresponding importance of its ports. Mexico’s reform granted a concession of 
the country’s 108 ports  to the Integral Port Administration (Administracion Portuaria Integral).
34  
In this landlord arrangement the state maintains property rights, while terminal and stevedore 
services are granted as concessions to private companies.
35  Similarly, in Panama 98 percent of 
port services are privately administered under landlord arrangements.
36  In Colombia, port reform 
was carried out because ports were inefficient under public administration;
37 like Mexico and 
Panama, Colombia adopted the landlord model.
38  Finally, Chilean port reform was carried out in 
three steps.
39  The first consisted of the decentralization of the most important Chilean port 
institution at that time, called “Emporchi,” which then was divided into 10 autonomous entities.
40  
Second, the private sector was incorporated into the port reform.
41  Finally, ports were opened to 
multi-operators instead of mono-operators.
42  Chilean port reform has emphasized competition 
between ports to improve its services.
43  In short, the successes of Panama, Colombia, Mexico, 
and Chile in port reform provide valuable examples for Central American countries to follow.   
In Central America, the need for new ports would not arise if port productivity could be 
increased to the levels achieved elsewhere in Latin America,
44  yet the low trade volume of many 
ports in Central America presents a challenge for achieving such productivity levels.
45  This, 
however, could be interpreted as a reason to rationalize port traffic in fewer but more modern 
and productive ports, improving infrastructure, competition, and efficiency.      
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3.3 Infrastructure Policies 
 
Infrastructure is crucial for generating growth, alleviating poverty, and increasing international 
competitiveness under CAFTA-DR.
46  For many years, port services in Central America have 
been under public monopolies because the intention of the governments was to protect the public 
interest in industries supplying essential services.
47  In addition, governments believed that 
making large investments with public resources was required to enhance infrastructure.   
Accordingly, a single public entity usually controlled every aspect of a utility—facilities,   
operations and administration—and determined which services would be provided to an 
essentially captive customer.
48  However, this approach resulted in extremely weak services and 
poor infrastructure in the region’s ports. 
CAFTA-DR will likely increase imports and exports.
49  Port development in terms of 
handling volume and services will significantly increase the need for accessibility improvements 
between ports and the mainland, and regional maritime transportation services can take pressure 
off the undeveloped and low quality road network.
50  As Central America requires further 
integration and improvement of the transportation network within and between countries,
51  ports 
in the region will be required to expand their capacities to keep pace with the estimated growth
52 
of CAFTA-DR-related demand throughout the next few years.   
CAFTA-DR does not only address the exchange of goods and services,
53  but also creates 
competition and strengthens economic growth in the region.
54  The growing importance of 
private operators in the transportation market is a result of new forces from the agreement.
55  
These private operators are expected to bring about faster progress in the use of information and 
communication technology than public or semi-public ownership.  Currently, the main problem 
connecting ports and the countryside is transportation, because there are deficiencies in road 
maintenance, airports, railways, and even ports themselves.
56  For instance, the deteriorating 
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highway system in Costa Rica is a common problem for exporters.
57  The planned extension of 
the Pacific and Caribbean corridor includes ceding the routes to private entities to recover 
construction and maintenance costs, which will add further direct cost to transportation services. 
Recently research has shown how transport inefficiencies affect successful development 
of trade and foreign investment,
58 and the CAFTA-DR countries should prove no exception.  
Even though the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and other donor countries 
have developed programs to liberalize trade regimes through economic policy reforms, countries 
are realizing that persistent weaknesses in infrastructure and institutional frameworks undermine 
those reforms.
59  Ports present an essential link in intermodal transport, which includes coastal 
shipping, and distances between ports are such that time in ports requires fast and agile 
procedures of the port services.
60  Ports in Central America, however, presently offer no special 
facilities for the region.  Central America has to overcome many obstacles such as port 
infrastructure and legal issues, among other needed reforms, to satisfy CAFTA-DR’s demands.  
The operation of the developing Central American port network requires careful examination in 
order to optimize services in all situations, as efficiency and liberalization are the main   
requirements for making Central American ports profitable. 
 
4. Liberalization of Maritime Transportation 
 
The liberalization of maritime transportation implicitly requires Central American governments 
to suppress many of the pre-existing controls transfer to the private sector the management of 
previously state-operated transport services.
61  This need is underscored by the fact that importers 
and exporters have claimed that the prices of transport services had dropped in real terms over 
this period in South America after port privatization, while in Central America those prices have 
been increasing.
62   
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4.1 Transportation Sector 
 
CAFTA-DR will help persuade Central American countries to liberalize their maritime 
transportation sector, which is composed of two elements: 1) international maritime transport 
(transportation per se) and 2) port services concerned with ships.
63  There is a common important 
element that will influence the evolution of CAFTA-DR, and this is the cost of transportation.  
However, this does not take into account the specific elements particular to each country.
64  The 
importance of transportation costs cannot be ignored, as they are in fact greater that of trade 
barriers
65 such as import duties, import licenses, export licenses, quotas, tariffs, and subsidies.  
Liberalization will reduce artificial barriers to trade (taxes, insurance, and others).  Port rates and 
protection provided by the cost of transportation is much higher than tariff barriers in trade.  
These needs notwithstanding, direct evidence based on prices and indirect evidence from 
the amount of cargo indicates that the cost of maritime freight has increased, while that of 
airfreight has decreased.
66  There is no doubt that transportation cost is strictly related to 
technological development, and to the restructuring process of the private sector as well as 
governments.
67  The incremental increases in CAFTA-DR’s exports and imports are expected to 
lead to a reduction of transport cost, and the involvement of the private sector in port investment 
and operations; otherwise, the agreement will just be a document.  
The traditional determinants of transportation costs continue to exercise a strong 
influence on maritime transport.
68  This could be readily by adapting the conclusions and 
recommendations of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Conference on International Transport Network and Logistics, which provide a thorough 
explanation of the costs linked to maritime transportation.
69  In that conference, the OECD 
identified some lessons that could be applied to maritime transport: efficiency gains, critical 
mass, and quality of services.  An efficiency gain will only materialize if appropriate price 
mechanisms are in place.
70  Critical mass justifies high investment in infrastructure and logistical 
                                                 
63 Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004).  
64 Mattos and Acosta (2003).  
65 Mattos and Acosta (2003).  
66 Hummels (1999).  
67 Hummels (1999). 
68 Fink, Mattoo and Neagu (2001).   
69 OECD (1997).  
70 Mattos and Acosta (2003,).    15
support to assure high efficiency and low-cost transportation.
71  Finally, the quality of services is 
crucial to the efficient functioning of the transportation chain.
72  All of these elements must be 
applied in Central American countries to satisfy the needs of port operations and to ensure the 
necessary infrastructure to achieve the goals of CAFTA-DR in the region.  
The biggest costs are in the operational field rather than the investment field.  Working 
capital is an especially important element within overall cost, and these costs must be absorbed 
by the private sector.  Additionally, the need for investment in equipment and operational 
infrastructure in the port must be borne by the private sector.  Financing provides a window for 
the private sector to undertake international investments, and financial support for the basic 
infrastructure of intermodal transport could come from traditional sources.       
Ports represent an essential link for intermodal transport.  Distances between ports and 
short times in port require speed and agility in procedures and port services.
73  Ports require 
adequate facilities and equipment with modern and supportive working practices, as well as 
adequate stevedores’ organizations.
74  In addition, international trade tariffs are not appropriate 
for coastal shipping. 
 
4.2 Transportation  Costs 
 
The cost of maritime transport is related to the efficient management of the port, and port 
efficiency measures have the same relevance for maritime transportation costs as distances. 
Central American governments have attempted to make their countries increasingly attractive for 
direct investment, CAFTA-DR provides hope that Central America will welcome the private 
sector and foreign investment.  For this reason, Central America is undertaking reforms to 
incorporate both domestic and foreign private sectors into industries that were previously 
controlled by the state.  Hopefully, ports will be one of the industries open to the private sector, 
as port privatization is an important element for increasing the region’s export competitiveness. 
In addition, the inherent discipline of a new competitive environment may render unnecessary a 
reassessment of the role of the port sector regulatory institutions (ministries, public agencies, and 
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port authorities).
75  These institutions have suffered problems such as political pressure, excess 
bureaucracy, and an absence of plans and clear objectives, among others.
76   
Given that Central America cannot escape from the global trend towards trade 
liberalization, integration, and economic reform, the incorporation and participation of domestic 
and foreign private actors could make a big difference in the region.  This means that Central 
America ports should accept the entry of new private operators that could compete with newly 
transformed public companies.  
Central America has to implement four strategies to solve its current port problems.   
These strategies are commercialization, liberalization, privatization, and modern polices.  Perfect 
commercialization refers to the reform of port institutions to make them work independently of 
political interference, and the development of quick solutions to changes in market 
circumstances.
77  In addition, commercialization would focus on changing operational practices 
and organizational structure.
78  Specifically, private sector operators would be able to would be 
able to engage in personnel hiring, firing, leasing, setting tariffs and targeting investments 
without being subject to bureaucratic approval.
79  The second strategy, liberalization, involves 
the reduction of monopolistic conditions in port operations.
80   Liberalization thus entails 
introducing public entities to competition in port services for common users, a major change 
from prevailing monopolies in port services in Central America.
81  Privatization is oriented 
towards selling public agencies to the private sector, with the purpose of eliminating subsidies, 
improving efficiency, and making the user pay the real cost of the services.  Finally, 
modernization concerns the improvement of institutions in charge of the ports.  If Central 
America follows these patterns, some of the main problems in the region’s ports will be solved, 
thus making them profitable and attractive to the private sector.   
Even though the private sector has been particularly involved in the maritime transport 
sector in Central America, it is not enough to make ports competitive.  According to CAFTA-
DR, there are two main reasons why the private sector must be involved in the development of 
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ports.
82  First, the private sector can offer services at a lower cost than the public sector.
83  This is 
the main reason for the agreement.  Second, using private capital liberates the public sector to 
allocate its resources to higher national priorities.
84   
In the case of ports, three factors must be taken into account.  First, expert private 
investors are very important for investment financing, since governments have restricted their 
budgets due to debt service payments, these investors must be enticed by potential profits.
85  
Second, rapid economic growth has generated new traffic, which requires new facilities and 
more efficient services.
86  Finally, competition is indispensable for stimulating the improvement 
of port facilities in Central America. Otherwise they are likely to be displaced by rival ports in 
the region such as Panama  and Cartagena (Colombia).
87  As the success of CAFTA-DR depends 
on these factors, Central American countries must improve their ports to make them competitive.  
The above-mentioned port capacities in the region, as well as estimated growth, are 
elements to be considered for future ports infrastructure development in Central America.  Ports 
in the region will be required to expand their capacities to satisfy the estimated growth in 
external demand over the next few years.
88  Improvements in facilities such as modern   buildings 
and advanced technology may reasonably be expected to decrease ports’ costs while increasing 
their productivity.   
 
4.3  Port Productivity  
 
Port activities, like any other, must be evaluated on the basis of their productivity. The 
determination of productivity plays an important role in the development of any business or 
institution,
89 and various indicators can measure a company’s performance and suggest where 
change may be necessary.
90  A service industry must first consider the satisfaction of its clients, 
and CAFTA-DR will require ports to improve their customer service. Generally, the port 
industry is associated with long-term investments, and its productivity is based on the number of 
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containers moved during the year.
91  Recently, ports have paid more attention to customer 
service, cost, and quality services.
92  Specific customer demands include faster and better 
services, competitive prices, a reduced incidence of damage to products during the operation 
process, and standard services such as ISO 9000
93 or the equivalent.  Many of the ports have data 
on their activities.  Productivity is determined according to how fast a port can load and unload a 
ship, and move it in and out of the port.  All of these issues are likely to have to have a negative 
influence the efficient implementation of CAFTA-DR in the region, if they are not corrected on 
time.  
When productivity is measured by the time that a ship spends in port, Central American 
ports generally perform poorly, although recent experiences in the region show that private ports 
surpass their public counterparts. For example, only two months after Costa Rica privatized the 
Pacific port of Caldera, the results were evident,
94 as productivity at this port increased by 63 
percent. The government and the shipping companies were satisfied with the quality and the rate 
of the work performed, as were importers and exporters.  
The number of containers moved in Caldera also shows interesting results. Before 
privatization, only 17 containers were moved per hour, compared to a and today, the movement 
of containers is up to twenty-seven per hour.  Likewise, the time for time for unloading and 
loading a ship was reduced 30 percent, and the port is now open 24 hours a day.  The 
improvements at this port will benefit both exporters and importers under CAFTA-DR.             
On the other side of the Costa Rican coast, however, the story is very different.   
Improving productivity is not an objective for the Caribbean port of Moin. This facility is run by 
public employees (paid by the Costa Rican government), whose October 2006 strike  effectively 
closed the port for two weeks,  to the great distress of the government, shipping companies, 
exporters, and importers.   
As noted by World Sea Trade Services (WSTS),
95 the Central American economy has 
been growing.
96 This is reflected in shipping: the number of containers entering the region has 
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risen from 1.41 percent in 2000 to 1.99 in 2005, and it is estimated that in 2010 it will increase 
by up to 2.56 percent.
97 The WSTS points out that the number of containers leaving the region 
has increased from 0.92 percent in 2000 to 1.22 in 2005, for a forecast of 1.66 by 2010.
98 Even 
though the region’s exports and imports have increased, ports in the region still have the same 
infrastructure, and there are no concrete projects for improving.
99  Of particular concern is that 
the figures cited immediately above were estimated before CAFTA-DR; the number of 
containers is expected to increase even more than these estimates, since Central America’s 
access to the vast US market has increased.  
Port serves as a border crossing for international carriers,
100 and cargo and ships crossing 
the border are assessed charges for their use of port facilities.  CAFTA-DR requires the 
signatories to not only speed customs procedures but also to improve trade facilities,
101  which 
include a logistics chain consisting of a variety of nodes. The chain process starts at the entrance 
buoy to the harbor and usually ends when the cargo passes through the port’s gates after it is 
nationalized and claimed by the consignee; related procedures include anchoring, inspection, 
security, and loading and unloading.
102  Although terminals are more efficient when port 
operators use computerized control systems, some Central American ports still lack 
computerized processes to optimize container movement and storage.  In addition, a number of 
ports in Central America also lack computerized processes to provide electronic conveyance of 
documents and data.
103  These factors will complicate CAFTA-DR implementation.   
The experience of  the port of Cartagena, however, suggests that many of these problems 
can be overcome through privatization.
104  Colombia realized that trade reform itself would be at 
risk unless structural constraints on trade were also addressed.
105 The country’s infrastructure 
assets, particularly ports, were notorious for low productivity.  Furthermore, Colombia’s ports 
were characterized by inefficiency, with inadequate security and extremely high operational 
                                                 
97 Hoffman (1999). 
98 Hoffman (1999). 
99 Hoffman (1999).   
100 Clark, Dollar and Micco (2004).  
101 CAFTA-RD 2004, Chapter 5).  
102 Bichou and Gray (2004).   
103 Kent and Hochstein (1998).  
104 Londoño-Kent and Kent (2003).  
105 Londoño-Kent and Kent (2003).     20
costs.
106  These problems were addressed in the port reform of 1990.
107  After opposition from 
national industries, Colombian ports have become a model for Latin America.   
Since freight carriers base their shipping decisions on the cost of doing business,
108 high 
costs and other deficiencies are likely to have a negative effect on CAFTA-DR imports and 
exports. This is a significant concern in light of Central America’s high freight rates, which 
cannot be attributed exclusively to low cargo volumes.
109  Port inefficiencies appear to be 
responsible as well.  
Unless these inefficiencies are addressed, they will notably impede the region’s economic 
development.  According to the Central America Commission of Maritime Transport, Central 
American ports are expected to grow by 8.7 percent per year in the Atlantic and 9.1 percent in 
the Pacific.
110 As an estimated 90 percent of world trade involves maritime transport, shipping is 
crucial in linking Central America to a growing world economy.
111  Nevertheless, along with 
trade advances, there are signs of concern due to the increasing demands of international 
standards such as the  International Code for the Protection of Ships and port installations, the 
container security initiative, the alliance of Customs and trade against terrorism, and concerns 
with bioterrorism, as well as traceability, technical standards, and sanitary and phitosanitary 
measures.
112  Central America will have to deal with these requirements.  Consequently, all of 
these requirements require additional effort and cost for trade and transport.  At the moment 
Central American countries may have the worst of both worlds: their ports have not assumed the 
full responsibility of meeting those standards, and they have also failed to delegate those 




Central American ports need several changes in order to satisfy CAFTA-DR demands, which 
will only be completed with the participation of the private sector.  Governments have 
demonstrated their incapacity to manage and update ports in the region.  Therefore, private sector 
participation must be incorporated into port operations to make them more competitive and 
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efficient, as well as less expensive. While there is no single standard to port investment and 
privatization in Central America, some approaches or models are used more than others, 
particularly the combination of public port authorities with private concessions or lease 
arrangements.  In general, the methods used depend on a range of factors, including local laws 
and practices, the level of demand for improved port services, supplies of the port services, and 
the extent and nature of competition.   
  However, deficient port administration, poor infrastructure, and the high cost of 
transportation in Central America under public control highlight the necessity of private sector 
involvement, especially in port operations and services, for meeting CAFTA-DR demands.   
Private sector involvement should not substitute for the importance of the public sector taking 
much more than just a passing interest in its seaport systems.  Whether through a port authority 
or other body, the public sector retains a central role in seaport planning, regulation, 
development and investment.  The deficiencies of the current approach, however, are becoming  
more evident every day. 
 Considering the investment in transport infrastructure, a discussion of port privatization 
must go beyond a narrow calculation of costs and benefits. It is particularly important to leave 
national perspectives behind and move towards a regional vision, beginning with regional   
dialogue.  In this dialogue port transportation represents the central nexus of a seamless 
intermodal transportation system that enjoys efficient cargo handling at each node.  
Ports can be updated with technological advances related to the vessels, their uses, and 
the congested and increasingly costly land transport of goods.  However, a fundamental question 
as to their viability exists: “Can ports survive without extensive government subsidies?”  In the 
case of Central America, this implies the creation of a balanced multimodal regional 
transportation system benefiting from existing geographical conditions.  Ports can play an 
important role in creating the pathway onwards a more environmentally friendly, financially 
affordable and sustainable transport system.     22
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